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Abstract 
 
This study aims to investigate whether the presence of institutional investors in family-controlled 
banks impacts their performance and risk. Using detailed data on Indonesian banks from 2001 to 
2008 and controlling for various factors, our results first show that family-controlled banks are 
less profitable and more risky than other banks. Specifically, family presence, either under the 
form of direct ownership, pure single majority, or family directors, is related to higher default 
risk, income variability, and loan risk. However, the presence of institutional investors as a 
second stage block holder in family controlled banks tends to mitigate and even reverse such 
behavior by reducing risk-taking and improving performance. Our results are generally robust 
with regard to endogeneity issues and alternative specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of research highlights that banks as well as other businesses in many 
countries are controlled and owned by families (Brown and Dinç, 2005; Naldi et al., 2007; 
Pathan, 2009; Wright and Kellermanns, 2011). In Western Europe, for instance, the 
Wallenbergs family owns Sweden’s largest bank, SEB and approximately 44% of European 
firms are controlled and ultimately owned by families (Faccio and Lang, 2002). In Latin 
America, Banco de Chile is controlled by the Luksic family and around 60% of the firms 
listed in the Bolse de Comercio de Santiago are family controlled firms (FCF) (Martínez et 
al., 2007). In Asia, families control more than 64% of the firms listed in the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. Thailand’s largest bank is under control of the Sophonpanich family while 
in Indonesia many banks are largely controlled by several families particularly during 
Soeharto’s presidency periods.  
In most cases, a family is often the ultimate owner of a business group consisting of 
several to numerous firms whose shares are either privately or publicly held. There are two 
broad categories of family shareholdings. On the one hand, the controlling family directly 
holds the shares through one or several of its members and commonly assigns one of them on 
the board as a director (family director). On the other hand, it can also indirectly control the 
firm through other businesses as their arm lengths (the so-called ultimate owner). Many 
believe that the presence of families influences the decision making processes and therefore 
family firms are theoretically considered as different from their counterparts (Bammens et 
al., 2011; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Because families' and family directors’ 
reputations are linked to the firm, they have stronger willingness and motivation to commit 
their resources to keep the business running for future generations.  Other studies, however, 
argue that the existence of owning families can adversely affect the firm performance and 
consider that family-controlled businesses (FCB) suffer from various problems such as a lack 
of professional management (Claessens et al., 2000; Schulze et al., 2003), expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003), inadequate capital structure due to its 
growing number of family members (Chandler, 1990), and skepticism by financial markets 
(Claessens et al., 2002).   
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Previous studies on family-owned businesses have shown mixed results (see, e.g., 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Heugens et al., 2009; Jiang and Peng, 2011a; Liu et al., 2011; 
Pindado and Requejo, 2014; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Some studies show that family-
controlled businesses tend to outperform their counterparts. This is in line with the conjecture 
that family controlled businesses allow the alignment of interest between parties specially 
when ownership  stakes are being held by a large family (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985). On the contrary, some studies find family ownership to create an 
environment in which members can easily undertake opportunistic actions at the cost of other 
investors (Claessens et al., 2000). Others find that family ownership does not significantly 
impact performance (Barry et al., 2011; Jiang and Peng, 2011b). Alternatively, the link 
between family ownership and risk or performance might be attenuated or reinforced by 
environmental and business factors (the contingency perspective). For instance, Attig et al. 
(2008) find that the presence of large shareholders other than the controlling owner in East 
Asian emerging markets curbs the private benefits of the controlling owner as captured by 
reduced cost of capital. There has been, however, up to date little research on the impact of 
family ownership, in the presence of other large shareholders, in the banking sector. 
To clarify the impact of family ownership on firms, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) 
argue that it is crucial to firstly distinguish the type of family involvement (i.e., ownership 
without being directly involved in the management of the firm and direct involvement by 
appointing a family member as a director). Other authors emphasize the role played by the 
institutional environment of the firm in dealing with agency problems (Chung and Chan, 
2012; Miller et al., 2011). In our study, the presence of family businesses in Indonesia can be 
traced for many decades but its increasing dominance started during the Suharto era and 
continues, although to a lesser extent, after the reformation period (post-1998). Unlike in 
Western countries, Indonesian firms, similarly to firms from other Asian countries, are often 
controlled by families (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) which mostly 
appoint their members to serve as directors. Because of poor investor protection, families can 
more easily expropriate minority shareholders than in other institutional environments. A 
survey by The Economist (1997) also highlights that the activities of family businesses in 
Indonesia during these periods largely involve social and political connections among the 
family tycoons, Suharto clan, and local companies. Such business practices, which also 
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prevail in the banking sector, engender concerns such as asset-grabbing, lucrative 
monopolies, exclusive tax treatments, and financial back-up seeking in case of distress. Since 
previous studies provide conflicting results and the role played by family firms remains a 
unresolved puzzle (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Heugens et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2012), it is 
important to study the impact of family ownership of banks on bank performance and risk in 
an emerging market with unique structural and institutional features.   
This study contributes the existing literature in several ways. First, while the large body 
of literature on bank ownership structure pays more attention on other characteristics, we 
offer evidence on what role family ownership plays in banks and specifically with regards to 
risk and performance.  Given that previous studies on family businesses have largely focused 
on North American and European countries (see, e.g., Wright and Kellermanns, 2011 for an 
excellent survey)1, by focusing on an emerging country our aim is provide more insights with 
regards to cultural, political, and institutional characteristics. Claessens and Fan (2002) argue 
that although Asia is very diverse region in terms of economic development and institutional 
environment, it nevertheless exhibits specific corporate governance arrangements that are 
generic to other countries and  most importantly the role of family ownership of firms2. Yet 
such issues have rarely been investigated regarding the Asian banking sector3. Second, we 
present evidence on how the type of control (direct versus indirect ownership) exerted by the 
controlling family affects risk and performance. As expropriation is more likely to occur in a 
country with weak investor protection (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; 
La Porta et al., 1999), we investigate the possible presence of expropriation through different 
types of control in Indonesia whose firms are largely family controlled. Third, we are able to 
distinguish cases where family control might be counterbalanced by the presence of multiple 
blockholders (i.e., family ownership combined with other institutional ownership) to further 
examine whether the presence of other important shareholders is likely to influence risk-
                                                          
1
 Also, see, e.g., Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Villalonga & Amit (2006) for the non-bank U.S. firms, Maury (2006) 
for Western Europe. 
2
 Joh (2003) studies non-financial firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange and finds that firms' profitability is 
lower when the controlling family’s ownership is lower. Bertrand et al., (2008) find that greater involvement by 
families in Thailand is related to lower performance. Boubakri et al., (2010) find that family in non-financial Asian 
firms leads to a higher equity premium due to the entrenchment. 
3
 Lin and Wu (2007) examine the case of families as shareholders of Taiwan’s financial firms, but do not distinguish 
type of controls and deal with endogeneity while Bunkanwanicha et al., (2012) investigate how family/group-
controlled banks in Thailand change their lending behavior across pyramidal tiers during distress periods. 
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taking (monitoring and disciplinary role). Fourth, this study is able to examine the effect of 
family involvement through its appointed directors with the argument that the presence of 
family members on the board puts more pressure to serve the family's interests than those of 
other stakeholders. Morck et al. (2005) and Peng and Jiang (2010) contend that assigning 
family members on the board is a key strategic decision to ensure that each firm’s direction is 
consistent with the goals of the family. Lastly, our study highlights the importance of 
corporate governance in the banking sector as addressed in the Basel accord (BIS, 2010) 
along with other bank prudential regulations. Hence, our results should provide guidance to 
bank regulators and supervisors in Asian emerging economies.   
Our results show that family ownership has a significant impact on bank performance and 
risk. We further find that family ownership under its various forms has a negative impact on 
bank performance (i.e. return on assets, return on equity and risk-adjusted return) and a 
positive effect on risk, supporting the expropriation conjecture. Nevertheless, the presence of 
institutional investors in family-owned banks contributes to better performance and lower 
risk. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature 
and our research focus. Section 3 presents the Indonesian institutional setting and bank 
corporate governance. The data, variables, and econometric specification we use are 
discussed in section 4.  Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Related literature and research focus 
The literature on family-owned firms has primarily focused on agency theory. Under this 
view, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
argue that concentrated investors such as family owners have higher incentives to closely 
monitor firm managers and hence mitigate agency problems and maximize firm value. The 
presence of families as major shareholders and also as managers could furthermore be 
advantageous because there would be perfect alignment between the interests of owners and 
managers. In such a case, the performance of family firms would be higher than that of their 
counterparts. Families also need to consider longer term investments because they will pass 
their business to their succeeding generations (Casson, 1999; James, 1999).  
In family firms, however, another type of agency problem can arise between minority and 
majority (i.e., family) owners who serve the potentially exploitative de facto agent (Morck 
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and Yeung, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The family interests might dominate over 
those of non-family (outside) shareholders (tunneling hypothesis). Hence, the controlling 
family has a negative influence on firms’ performance (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2005; Morck 
et al., 1988). In the same vein, other authors assert that controlling shareholders including 
families could extract private benefits from the firm as well as pursue different objectives as 
compared to those of minority shareholders (Anderson et al., 2009, 2012; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Likewise, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) argue that the expropriation 
occurs through excessive compensation and perquisites, related-party transactions, or special 
dividends that can easily emerge in family firms.  
Such expropriation should be more pronounced when the country has a weak investor 
protection (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Apart from this, family characteristics may be 
detrimental for the value-enhancing goal of firms. For instance, family-controlled firms are 
very vulnerable to family conflicts and coordination problems leading to ineffective 
management (Arregle et al., 2007).  
Studies on family firms also seek further explanations based on stewardship theory. This 
theory posits that leaders (e.g., family directors) are not simply self-serving individuals, but 
are emotionally linked to the family and highly committed to the benefit of the organization 
and the owning family (Davis et al., 1997; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Family 
members focus primarily on running the business for the interest of the family and have 
therefore a greater incentive to follow the family’s direction and do not necessarily require 
close monitoring (Cruz et al., 2010). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argue that a family member, 
who is also considered to have personal, emotional, and historical attachment to the firm, will 
prioritize the collective interest of all members over her/his personal interests because she/he 
perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior, which positively contributes to the firm 
performance. Hence, this theory predicts that family firms will outperform their counterparts 
as supported by previous studies (Hoopes and Miller, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
The arguments above highlight that the owning family is a key aspect of corporate 
governance mechanisms (Anderson et al., 2012; Anderson and Reeb, 2003), distinguishing 
governance practices between family firms and non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). More importantly, the type and the extent of family 
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control and involvement in the firm will determine monitoring incentives, strategic behavior, 
performance and risk. 
Whilst the empirical evidence on the relationship between family ownership and 
performance in the banking sector is very limited, there are even fewer studies on the 
relationship between family ownership and bank risk (Lin and Wu, 2010). Studies by Naldi 
et al. (2007) and Barry et al. (2011) find that family-controlled businesses generally exhibit 
lower risk than non-family businesses. In contrast, Villalonga and Amit (2006) suggest that 
family-owned firms show higher risk, both systematic and idiosyncratic. Agency-based 
literature generally concludes that in emerging countries family businesses have a strong 
incentive to distort information in order to extract private benefits (Anderson et al., 2009; 
Chin et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2004). Shareholders might hence find it difficult to assess 
business values and performance since the quality of information is questionable (Fan and 
Wong, 2002). Hence, information distortion in family-controlled banks leads other investors 
to require higher returns (i.e., above-average rate of returns) regardless of the actual risk due 
to a higher perceived uncertainty. Considering that any choice will produce similar required 
returns, the controlling family might choose to take higher risk. Hence, it is argued that 
family ownership in an emerging economy such as Indonesia is positively associated with 
bank risk.  
Further, previous literature argues that families can exert and/or reinforce their control 
over firms through pyramids that allow them to use one firm to control another firm with 
small direct investment (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; La Porta et al., 1999). Such evidence 
is more pronounced in Asian firms compared to those in Western countries. Claessens et al. 
(2000) document that firms in Indonesia and Thailand are largely family-controlled with 
voting rights frequently exceeding cash flow rights, suggesting that pyramidal structures are 
prevalent. Such arrangements crucially influence the family’s ability and incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002). In other words, indirect control by 
a family can differently affect firm performance, as opposed to direct control, because the 
family's interests are served through control chains with weaker scrutiny by management.  
Families are presumably prone to private benefit extraction, particularly in a civil law 
country and/or a less developed institutional environment, if they are not monitored by other 
large shareholders (see, e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011). Fama and 
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Jensen (1983) argue that the standard owner-manager conflict does not apply to a large 
proportion of family firms. They argue that the family often acts as both the principal, in the 
sense that it invests its wealth, and as the agent to protect its own interests through its 
representative which in turn leads to conflicts between the family and other minority 
investors (owner-owner conflict).  
Laeven and Levine (2008) highlight that publicly listed firms with multiple blockholders 
in Western Europe have a different market value than widely held firms or firms with a 
single large owner. They further report that blockholders are less likely to cooperate and 
form coalitions when they are of different types (family, government, and institutional 
investor). Hence, firms can benefit from the presence of multiple large owners of different 
types and their mutual monitoring roles. Attig et al. (2008) argue that the failure to consider 
blockholders beyond the largest controlling owner in previous studies reflects the assumption 
that only the former represents a homogenous group with the rest of the shareholders having 
little incentive to monitor the firm. However, such blockholders may play a significant role 
because they can collude with others or even compete for corporate control. Using a sample 
of firms from eight East Asian countries Attig et al. (2008) find that the presence of multiple 
large shareholders, beyond the largest shareholder, significantly reduces the cost of equity 
which in turn increases the firm value, ceteris paribus. They document that the governance 
role played by other large shareholders is relatively more valuable in East Asia where 
complex ownership structures potentially embed more severe agency conflicts. The benefit 
brought by the presence of a second large owner is also supported by Lehmann and Weigand 
(2000) who find that the existence of a second large shareholder is related to higher 
profitability for German firms.  
Hence, the domination of the family's interests therefore might need to be balanced with 
an ownership structure that limits the family’s discretions over firm resources and possible 
expropriation. A second large shareholder has higher incentives to professionally monitor 
and discipline the firm, and prevents further opportunistic behavior by the family which in 
turn might affect performance and risk differently (Anderson et al., 2003; Attig et al., 2008; 
Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000).  
With regard to family involvement on the board, the owning family can assign directors 
to serve its interests and to actively participate to daily activities (active involvement). 
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Empirically, family firms’ boards in South and East Asia are mainly dominated by their 
members and nominees (Filatotchev et al., 2005). In line with this, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003, 2004) argue that the presence of family directors reduce information asymmetry and 
agency problems between the directors and the family since they will place the family's 
interests over their personal interests. Similarly, the resource-based theory pinpoints the 
advantages of having family directors (Barney, 2001). Unlike outside directors, family 
directors share common identity, loyalty, and trust. Such characteristics are highly valuable 
and hard-to-imitate competitive advantages (Chu, 2009; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Liu 
et al., 2011; Luo and Chung, 2005). Further, family directors often fill the institutional voids 
to overcome market inefficiency particularly in emerging countries (Chakrabarty, 2009; Lee 
et al., 2008). 
In contrast to the argument above, an active involvement by the owning family, through 
the appointed directors, can nevertheless distort the board’s independence particularly in 
delivering objective judgments and preventing earnings management (Xie et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, Wright and Kellermanns (2011) suggest that board comprising family and non-
family members engender an important issue; the family directors, for instance, may meet 
informally without involving non-family directors. In some cases, family directors 
outnumber non-family members leading to the dominance of family members.  In addition, 
when family members hold positions on the board, firms bear the costs of excluding more 
capable and talented outsiders (Giovannini, 2009). Therefore, firms are exposed to higher 
risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. Based on the arguments above, the presence of 
family directors (i.e., active involvement) could be either detrimental or positive for firm 
performance.  
Regarding risk taking behavior for banks with family directors, on the one hand there 
may be a higher perceived risk by outside shareholders who will face difficulties in 
monitoring and disciplining underperforming family directors (Morck and Yeung, 2003; 
Schulze et al., 2003). Specifically, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) argue that the 
presence of family directors without strong outside monitoring not only induces 
expropriation but also gives more discretion to engage in risky behavior. On the other hand, 
family directors have higher incentives to secure the family’s interests. For this reason, they 
are more likely interested in longer-term investments from which they get economic benefits 
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that in turn will be passed onto the next generations (Casson, 1999; James, 1999). Under this 
view, family directors may prefer lower risk investments to secure the firm in the long run. 
Hence, the appointment of family directors can affect risk in both directions. Nevertheless, as 
argued above, the presence of a second large shareholder, such as an institutional investor, 
might influence the firm’s strategic decisions and risk-taking.  
3. The Indonesian institutional setting and bank corporate governance 
Indonesia has experienced a substantial economic growth until the 1997 financial crisis 
hit South East Asia. The crisis called for the review of the existing corporate governance 
characteristics such as a very high degree of ownership concentration by family/business 
groups (e.g., Claessens et al. (2000) note that 71.5% of listed companies are owned by a 
family/business group), an excessive government-led growth (Hanazaki and Liu, 2007), lack 
of transparency and control (Zhuang et al., 2000), and poor investor protection (Obata, 2003). 
Many firms and banks in the country are owned by the few richest families, and highly 
connected to the ruling political parties. For instance, Fisman (2001) finds that Indonesian 
firms were largely politically connected to the ruling party and that their stock prices were 
very sensitive to the health reports of former President Suharto. Most of the sample firms 
were found to be owned by Suharto's allies such as Bob Hasan (Nusamba Group), Liem Sioe 
Liong (Salim Group), and Prajogo Pangestu (Barito Pacific Group) and affiliated with 
President Suharto’s children (Bimantara and Citra Lamtoro Groups). This study concludes 
that politically dependent firms, on average, incurred more losses during the periods of 
increasing threat to Suharto’s health than less-dependent firms. In such an environment, the 
banking sector was highly vulnerable due to the over reliance of firms on external funding 
leading to higher credit risk. In addition, ineffective supervision due to the characteristics of 
the two-tier board system has been considered as one important factor behind the crisis 
(Zhuang et al., 2000).  
During 1997, Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) was authorized to provide emergency loans 
to banks suffering from critical liquidity and bank run problems due to the deterioration of 
public confidence. Besides, this scheme was not fully successful since it was frequently 
conducted on an ad-hoc basis without predetermined mechanisms and adequate transparency. 
An explicit limited deposit guarantee (i.e. up to Rp20 millions per account of deposits) was 
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introduced at the end of 1997 but this failed to prevent further bank runs. In January 1998, 
the government of Indonesia (GoI) introduced a blanket guarantee that covers all commercial 
banks’ liabilities in all currency denomination. Along with improving financial stability and 
public confidence, the coverage of deposit insurance was revised to cover up to Rp5 billions 
(limited guarantee) in 2006, Rp1 billion in the beginning of 2007 and reduced to Rp100 
millions in the middle of 2007, but again increased up to Rp2 billions in 2008.  
In 1999, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) set the regulation (Regulation No. 28) on 
merger, consolidation, and acquisition for the banking sector, allowing more individual and 
institutional investors including foreigners to participate as owners. Such a regulation aimed 
to improve banks’ capital standards and performance that severely deteriorated during the 
financial crisis. Another goal was to prevent excessive ownership concentration that could 
potentially harm minority owners and public interest. In the post-crisis period (1997-2000) 
61 banks were closed, 54 were taken-over, and 39 recapitalized. Accordingly, in October 
2004 Bank Indonesia set a regulation, the so-called single presence policy (PBI No. 
16/2006), in order to strengthen the banking system, improve economies of scale, and 
promote effective bank supervision. This regulation stipulates that a controlling owner (i.e., 
either individual, institutional, direct or indirect) can only be the controlling owner in one 
bank. As a consequence, a shareholder that controls more than one bank has to adjust by 
either (1) selling the shares of the other bank(s) to new investors or (2) acquiring the other 
bank(s) or (3) establishing a bank holding company. This regulation does not apply for 
foreign banks and joint venture banks. 
In the meantime, BI has introduced several regulations in order to promote good 
corporate governance particularly in the banking sector such as imposing a fit and proper test 
on bank board members, requiring a compliance director, and the introduction of independent 
board members. However, the implemented rules have not limited the number of family 
members sitting on the board allowing families to still exert their power through either direct 
or indirect control. The prevalence of owning families can be observed in most business 
groups. Approximately 87% of the banks in our sample, for instance, belong to both families 
and business groups. Only around 13% of non-family controlled banks belong business 
groups. This characteristic potentially entices controlling families to engage in expropriation 
activities (tunneling hypothesis) or otherwise to prop up the banks and other firms in the 
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groups. By regulation, an independent board member is a person that is not allowed to have 
such a relationship (i.e. familial relationship) with the controlling shareholders. In addition, 
the circular letter of Bank Indonesia (No. 9/12/DPNP/2007) specifies that the president 
director (CEO) needs to be independent from the controlling family. In other words, a family 
can place its directors in positions other than president and independent directors. However, 
banks need to declare any familial relationship between the board members and shareholders 
as stipulated by the Bank Indonesia Regulations (No 8/4/PBI/2006 and PBI 8/14/PBI/2006). 
Hence, banks are also required to annually disclose all circumstances in which a potential 
conflict of interests could arise between the members of the board of directors, board of 
supervisors, and top management.  
 
4. Data, variables, and empirical setting 
4.1.  Sample 
The sample of this study consists of Indonesian banks namely regional development 
banks, state-owned banks, domestic private banks, foreign-owned banks and joint venture 
banks. We exclude rural banks and Islamic banks because of their small share in the banking 
industry, (1.39% and 2.11% respectively).  
Most of our data is extracted from banks' annual reports, banks’ web sites, the data 
directory service of Indonesian Banking Institutes, news releases, and other relevant sources. 
We gather financial indicators as well as the name of board directors and board 
commissioners. Particularly, we identify the family and its members who hold the ownership 
through direct or ultimate ownerships (pyramidal structure), and track if the family appoints 
its member(s) to serve as the director on the board. To identify ultimate ownership, as in 
previous studies (see, e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 
1999; Maury, 2006; Pindado et al., 2014), we often have to gather information on affiliated 
firm’s reports. It is very common that the children's family names in Indonesia are different 
from the parents’ family names and we therefore pay a lot of attention when gathering the 
family members. When such data is not available in banks’ annual reports or web sites, we 
seek information on familial relationship from marriage ceremonies or funeral services 
announced in available publications and news. In other cases, particularly for banks which 
are owned by business groups, we are able to collect more detailed profiles of family 
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members and directors in the affiliated firm’s report/websites or from banking magazines and 
newspapers that publish bankers’ profiles including information on their families.  We also 
retrieve data from available on-line services to verify or to complete the previous ones. We 
end up with 105 banks that contribute to 97.6% of the aggregate assets of the Indonesian 
banking system during the 2001-2008 period. 
  
4.2.  Measurement of Variables 
4.2.1. Measuring performance and risk 
This study uses several proxies to measure bank performance and risk. First, we consider 
the return on assets (ROA) that is defined as net income divided by total assets. Secondly, 
we use the return on equity (ROE), defined as net income divided by total equity. Both ROA 
and ROE are commonly used to measure performance. These proxies might not fully reflect 
the returns that compensate for each unit of risk. We hence utilize risk-adjusted returns 
which are defined as ROA or ROE divided by their respective standard deviations 
calculated from the last three observations for the respective years (i.e., t, t-1, and t-2). 
Regarding risk taking, we use two main measures namely the standard deviation of ROA 
(SDROA) and the standard deviation of ROE (SDROE). Calculations for both standard 
deviations are based on the last three observations for the respective year (i.e., t, t-1, and t-
2). Additionally, we also use the ratio of non-performing loan to gross loans (NPL) to 
measure bank loan risk. To measure default risk, we use Z-score (ADZP) as in Goyeau and 
Tarazi (1992), Lepetit et al. (2008) and Barry et al. (2011) which is defined as follows: 
                               (1)             
where the first term represents bank asset risk, named ADZP1and the second measures 
leverage risk, named ADZP2.  
 
4.2.2. Family ownership and control variables 
The main variable of this study is family ownership (Family). This variable takes the 
value of one if the largest controlling shareholder is a family holding at least 10% of the 
control rights either through direct ownership (including individual family members) or 
through its affiliated firms (ultimate ownership). Otherwise, the variable is equal to zero. La 
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Porta et al. (1999) argue that in many emerging economies large control stakes are not 
unusual and therefore minimum thresholds for family ownership are common in the 
literature. Considering a threshold of 10% is common in the literature (see, e.g., Claessens et 
al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Maury, 2006; Pindado et al., 2014). 
It is assumed that such shareholders have an effective control of the firm. In a pyramidal 
structure a family can be the ultimate owner of a firm without directly holding at least 10% 
of its shares. For example, if a family owns 40% of the shares of firm A, which owns 30% 
of firm B, which in turn owns 10% of bank C, the family ends up with 10% of the control 
rights of bank C. For robustness considerations we also examine how the results are affected 
by imposing a threshold of 25% which is the one used by Indonesian regulatory authorities 
to define the controlling owners regardless the form of the ownership. 
We then segregate the type of control into several categories. First, direct control 
(Fam_direct) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the family including all its members has 
a direct ownership of at least 10%, and zero otherwise (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013; La Porta et al., 1999). Alternatively, we consider a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the family indirectly controls the bank (i.e., through a pyramidal structure) 
and report the results in the robustness section.  Second, to examine the impact of a family 
as the only controlling shareholder we use a dummy of one if the family controls the bank 
solely (Family_only) with no other shareholders or institutions controlling the bank, at our 
threshold of either 10% or 25%. Third, as discussed previously, the second largest owner, 
particularly an institutional investor, has strong incentives to monitor and discipline the 
bank, to prevent opportunistic behavior by the family. To account for such an effect we set a 
dummy variable (i.e., Family_with_inst) that takes the value of one if both a family and an 
institutional investor have, each, an ownership of at least 10% and zero otherwise. As 
argued above, the presence of such multiple shareholders may allow for cross-monitoring of 
each other, reducing expropriation and/or mitigating excessive risk taking (Attig et al., 
2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2008).  
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
We include several plausible variables influencing the dependent variables based on 
previous literature. Many argue that political connections play a significant role in the firm 
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business (Claessens et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2009; Goldman et al., 2009; Liang et al., 
2013). Firms with frequent government deals would place a high value on directors with the 
ability to influence government decisions (Adams et al., 2010). Such firms will hence likely 
appoint board members with political background (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). In Asia, 
Fisman (2001) finds that political connections are very important for firms’ performance 
and more generally for the economy as a whole in a country like Indonesia. Nys et al. 
(2014) observe that politically connected banks in Indonesia are able to attract deposits 
more easily than their non-connected counterparts. Other studies also find the importance of 
political connections with regard to performance and risk (Carretta et al., 2012; Gul, 2006; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Following Francis et al. (2009) and Nys et al. (2014), we 
consider the effect of political connections in family banks by introducing a dummy variable 
(PolCon) equal to 1 if the bank is a state-owned banks or a private bank with at least one 
owner, director, or commissioner (supervisory body) being a political party member, a 
parliament member, a government official, a former parliament member and/ or a former 
government official, and zero otherwise. Being politically connected might not only provide 
banks with more subsidies and profitable contracts from the politicians or the government 
but also induce them to take higher risk and to operate inefficiently given the firm's 
protected status. 
Following previous studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Berger et al., 2005) we consider 
bank size (Size) as the natural logarithm of total assets to play an important role as well. 
Larger banks might benefit from lower average costs due to economies of scales and thus 
exhibit better performance. Larger banks could also benefit from To-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) 
safety net subsidies leading to higher risk taking (De Nicolo, 2000). Next, we control for 
bank diversification (Diver) which is also known to influence risk. Some studies find that 
diversification into non-traditional banking activities provide benefits such as lower 
earnings volatility (Boyd et al., 1993), and higher profitability (Elsas et al., 2010). In 
contrast, other studies find that such diversification strategies reduce bank value (Laeven 
and Levine, 2007) and risk-adjusted returns because fee-based income tends to be more 
volatile but not necessarily more profitable than traditional (interest-based) activities (e.g., 
Berger et al., 2010; DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Hence, we 
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include a diversification measure based on the relative importance of net interest income and 
non-interest income in total income as follows: 
                         (2) 
where Int denotes interest income, Com denotes commission revenue, Trad denotes trading 
revenue, and Other denotes all other revenue. TOR represents total operating revenue and is 
equal to the sum of Int, Com, Trad, and Other. The use of gross income is believed to better 
avoid a distorted diversification measure since a loss on some activities will underestimate 
their importance in bank operations. We also consider bank leverage, measured by equity-
to-total assets (Capital) ratio, which affects the bank's ability to collect deposits, to lend and 
hence to earn profits. Banks with high equity ratios are likely to have lower bankruptcy 
costs and accordingly lower cost of capital that in turn increases their margin or 
profitability, ceteris paribus.  
Banks that are listed on a stock exchange are likely to be exposed to tighter monitoring 
and market discipline, and therefore their performance and risk should be different from 
those of non-listed banks. In addition, having a publicly-listed status may allow them to 
access cheaper sources of funds. Following Liang et al. (2013), we include a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the bank is listed (Listed) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we introduce a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a bank with foreign ownership (Foreign) of 
50% or more and 0 otherwise (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). Such a bank can be a 
branch of a foreign bank, a subsidiary, or a joint venture entity. While a large number of 
studies generally conclude that the presence of foreign investors is beneficial in terms of 
financial stability or loan losses (e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Claessens, 2006; Cull and Martínez 
Pería, 2013), their presence also leads to lower intermediation cost (i.e. spreads or margins) 
and lower profitability (Beck et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2001). We also include the 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of banking sector concentration based on banks’ assets. 
It is widely believed that banks’ performance and risk vary depending on market 
concentration. We also consider the deposit insurance regime as a control variable because 
during the period under study, important changes were brought in terms of maximum 
coverage particularly from 2005 to 2008. Better covered depositors will likely have a 
weaker incentive to monitor the bank to prevent it from pursuing riskier activities (Demsetz 
et al., 1997; Martínez Pería and Schmukler, 2001). Furthermore, explicit deposit insurance 
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is often considered as creating higher moral hazard incentives leading to higher financial 
fragility and increasing the likelihood of bank crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2002). Deposit insurance (Covdep) is measured by ln (1+coverage of deposit insurance) 
where coverage of deposit insurance is the ratio of the explicit coverage limit per deposit 
account to the average deposit per capita (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2005). 
 
4.3. Regression models 
To test our hypotheses, we consider several models as follows: 
  (1) 
                (2) 
 
Performance is measured by ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA, and adjusted ROE. Risk is 
measured by ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, SDROE, and NPL. The Family variable is 
either Family, Fam_direct, Family_only, or Family_with_inst. Control variable is the vector 
of other variables as described in Appendix 1. 
Pathan (2009) argues that empirical studies on bank governance and performance suffer 
from endogeneity that partly comes from the nature of the variables. With regard to the 
estimation model, the independent variables might be influenced by unobserved 
heterogeneity and might be subject to endogeneity concerns. A specific ownership structure 
and hence the type of control at a given point in time could be affected by past performance 
or other characteristics (see, e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007). Anderson et al. (2011), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) and Carter et al. (2010) who argue that board structure –e.g., family 
director- and firm performance are endogenous. For these reasons, we use the instrumental 
variables (IV) approach in our regressions.  
 
5. Results 
5.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
We start by reviewing our sample statistics. As aforementioned, this study includes 105 
Indonesian banks during the 2001-2008 period consisting of 45 family banks and 60 non-
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family banks. Before we go further, we exclude outliers by eliminating the extreme 
observations (1% lowest and 1% highest values) and check the statistical properties of the 
considered variables by conducting mean tests and distribution tests for all the variables. 
Accordingly, we get approximately 840 bank-years observations, of which 42.4% (356 
observations) are for family banks and 57.6% (484 observations) are for non-family banks. 
Families can exercise their control through direct ownership or indirectly through affiliated 
firms. Our sample reveals that almost half of the families (47.5%) have direct ownership 
while the rest (52.5%) have indirect ownership. Furthermore, 33.9% (285 observations) of 
our banks have family members sitting on the board (family directors).  
Table 1 presents several descriptive statistics regarding our variables of interest. Non-
family banks generally exhibit higher performance than family banks in all our measures. On 
average, the profitability of family banks (ROA and ROE) is two times lower than that of 
non-family banks. For example, the average ROE for pure family banks, where a family is 
the only controlling owner, is 11. % (11.6% for all family banks irrespective of the presence 
or not of other institutional shareholders) while for non-family banks it reaches 23%. The 
differences in the performances of family and non-family banks are statistically significant 
(see Panel B for mean difference tests). Almost similarly, both the ROA and the ROE are 
higher in non-family banks than in family banks with institutional ownership (multiple 
shareholders) but the differences in adjROA and adjROE between both groups are not 
significant.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
Table 1 also presents our risk measures –i.e. ADZP, ADZP1, and ADZP2, SDROA, 
SDROA, and NPL- along with other variables considered for the family and non-family 
banks. Except for ADZP1, family banks exhibit on average lower risk. The mean values of 
SDROA, SDROE, and NPL are slightly higher for non-family banks than family banks.   
Furthermore, 61 of our sample banks have political connections, providing us with 489 
bank-years observations (58.2% of total observations). Around 48% of family banks and 
66.33% of non-family banks are linked to political power. 
18 
 
As discussed earlier, family-controlled banks may face constraints to grow because the 
founders commonly dislike issuing equity and share ownership with outsiders. Therefore 
such banks might have lower incentives to become larger compared to non-family banks. 
Table 1 shows that the average size (Size) of non-family banks (Rp18.5 trillion) is 
approximately three times larger than that of family banks (Rp6.6 trillion). Family banks are 
also less engaged in more diversified activities (see Diversification in Table 1) and non-
family banks are more likely to take higher risk and engage in more profitable investment 
opportunities. The average of the diversification index of non-family banks is equal to 19.9% 
while that of family banks is limited to 10.3%. Capital ratios are also, on average, higher in 
family banks. It is worth to note that, in our sample, a family-controlled bank is more likely 
to be controlled by a business group. In particular, a larger proportion (86%) of banks owned 
by a business group is also family bank. For this reason (i.e., high correlation between family 
and group dummy which is equal to 0.73), we exclude the group dummy in our further 
analysis. 
Table 2 reports the correlation between variables. The presence of a family under its 
various forms is associated with lower performance as indicated by the negative correlation 
coefficients.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Turning to risk measures, Table 2 shows a negative correlation between family presence 
and default risk. Direct ownership (Fam_direct) is related to higher risk but indirect 
ownership through pyramids is related to lower risk. Family banks with another second 
largest owner (multiple shareholders) positively correlate with default risk (ADZP and 
ADZP2) and negatively with income volatility (SDROA and SDROE).   
 As a whole, family banks generally exhibit lower performance and lower risk than non-
family banks suggesting that they might prefer to play more safely to secure wealth for their 
next generation. Nevertheless, direct ownership (Fam_direct) by families is associated with 
lower performance but also higher risk (except for NPL).  
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5.2.  Family ownership, types of control, performance and risk 
As argued above, the explanatory variables used in this study might not be strictly 
exogenous. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider that the main variable in our models is 
an endogenous variable as in previous studies on bank governance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 
2004; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Also, under regulatory pressure, distressed banks are 
often acquired or taken over by non-family investors implying ownership changes.  
Previous studies highlight the importance to account for the unobserved effect, and to 
deal with reverse causality and simultaneity by using an instrumental variables / two-stage 
least squares approach (IV/2SLS). In our study, we consider regulatory quality and the 
natural logarithm of the bank’s age as the instruments by checking their validity with the 
Hansen test. Previous studies argue that ownership structure, particularly in emerging 
markets, is endogenously determined by country circumstances including economic, legal 
and regulatory infrastructures (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For this purpose, we use the regulatory quality / rule of law 
index4, a part of The Worldwide Governance Indicator developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
This indicator captures the perceptions of the ability of the country to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The age (in natural logarithm) of the bank, by construction, is exogenous and is 
often used as an instrument in the literature (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Table 3 reports the regression results using the IV approach. For each model, we indicate 
the estimated coefficients, t-statistics, Hansen tests of instrument validity, F-test and the 
number of observations. Except for model (3) Panel B, none of the Hansen tests present any 
statistical significance. This indicates that the null hypothesis that all instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term is not rejected and therefore our instruments in all models 
are valid. Our results suggest that F-statistics across all 1st stage regressions in our models are 
greater than the cut-off value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock et al., 2002)5, which 
suggests that our instrument is relevant and does not suffer from weak instrument concerns. 
Further, family variables are empirically endogenous and affected by variables including the 
instruments as reported by endogeneity test results (last row of Table 3). 
                                                          
4
 During the period covered by our sample, Indonesia experienced several political and regulatory changes which 
substantially impacted banking regulation.  
5
 To conserve space, the outputs are not reported here but available from authors upon request. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Panel A presents the regression results with ROA, ROE, adjusted ROA and adjusted 
ROE as the dependent variables. The coefficients of Family show negative signs, indicating 
that the presence of families leads to lower performance. This evidence is consistent with 
Filatotchev et al. (2005), Morck et al. (1988) and Barry et al. (2011).  
 As mentioned above, we introduce several types of family control namely direct 
ownership (Fam_direct), Family_only, and Family_with_inst. For the first category, 
Fam_direct, in which the family has substantial direct ownership (10% threshold)  the results 
are quite similar to those in Panel A; direct control by a family (Fam_direct) has a negative 
impact on ROA, ROE, adjROA, and adjROE (see Panel B, Table 3). This suggests that direct 
control by family is not only related to lower performance as measured by ROA and ROE, 
but also to lower risk-adjusted returns (adjROA and adjROE). This result is presumably  
driven by a reduction in performance rather than an increase in risk as suggested by the 
correlation matrix.  
Panel C reports the results when we use Family_only as our main variable. We find that 
the coefficients of Family_only are all negative and significant for all our performance 
measures (ROA, ROE, adjROA and adjROE). The results above support the argument that 
family direct ownership negatively affects performance. Family banks probably face several 
problems such as domination of their interest over those of non-family shareholders, 
inappropriate board structure and assignment, or other expropriation behavior leading to 
lower performance (Anderson et al., 2009; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000). In Panel D, we 
consider the presence of an institutional shareholder holding a significant equity stake as the 
second largest investor6. We conjecture that such an owner can effectively challenge the 
powerful controlling family. Our results show a positive impact of Family_with_inst 
(multiple shareholders) on performance, suggesting that such an ownership structure allows 
monitoring and discipline to operate effectively. The presence of an institutional shareholder 
                                                          
6
 One can argue that institutional investors are only attracted by particular family banks. Hence, we run a causality 
test and find that institutional investors are not affected by family, or vice versa. However, regulations such as on 
merger, acquisition, and recapitalization following the 1998 financial crisis as captured by our instruments can 
influence the presence of institutional investors as the second largest owner.   
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as the second largest shareholder positively influences performance as argued in previous 
studies (Attig et al., 2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2008).  
Political connections, particularly to the ruling parties, not only provide favorable deals 
and protected status (Adams et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003) 
but are also likely to expose the bank’s performance to adverse political changes (Fisman, 
2001; Gul, 2006).  Our results show that this variable is related to lower performance, but its 
impact becomes positive (Panel D).  
 We find that being a listed bank (Listed) does not significantly impact performance. 
Next, supposedly, larger banks are able to achieve better performance but our results show 
that size negatively affects ROA and ROE in Panel A and C. Higher capital ratios are found 
to positively affect profitability.  
Our results also show that diversification is negatively associated with adjROA and 
adjROE but not significantly linked with ROA and ROA, suggesting the presence of a 
positive effect on risk. Further, the impact on performance of Foreign is negative in line with 
Claessens et al. (2001) and Beck et al. (2008). Lastly, our results indicate that market 
concentration (HHI), which was driven down by regulation during our sample period, 
positively affects performance.  
Regarding risk taking behavior, as discussed earlier, family ownership could prevent the 
bank from taking optimal investments if the family believes that by doing so the bank will 
bear more risk and in turn might not ensure wealth and business continuation for the next 
generation. Consequently, the expected impact of Family on risk should be negative. 
However, since information distortion is arguably prevalent in family-controlled banks, it is 
difficult for outside investors to estimate the business risk profiles. Also, the family might 
have strong incentives to distort information in order to extract private benefits (Anderson et 
al., 2009). The bank might find it reasonable to take higher risk since, for any level of risk it 
takes, outside investors will charge the above average rate of return because of asymmetric 
information. This problem is more pronounced in emerging markets, given that investor 
protection is commonly poor. The family has a higher incentive to expropriate and also to 
take higher risk at the expense of minority shareholders, particularly in the absence of 
another blockholder (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Considering 
the two arguments above, the net effect probably depends on which argument is more 
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dominant. For this purpose, we run regressions of risk measures (ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, 
SDROA, SDROE, and NPL) on family variables and report the results in Table 4. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ] 
  
Panel A (Table 4) presents the regressions with Family as the main variable. Our results 
show that the coefficients of Family, irrespective of ownership structure, are associated with 
higher risk. More specifically, Family is associated with higher default risk (ADZP, AZDP1, 
and ADZP2) and higher income volatility (SDROA and SDROE). The coefficient for NPL, 
however, is not significant. In Panels B, where the variable of interest is respectively 
Fam_direct all the coefficients are significant and indicate a positive effect on risk.  The same 
findings hold for Panel C where the variable of interest is Family only i.e. banks with a 
family as the only controlling owner. Hence, the risk taking incentives proposition appears to 
dominate the risk aversion proposition yielding higher risk in family banks. In contrast, when 
we use Family_with_inst, bank risk decreases as shown by the positive and significant 
coefficients for default risk and negative and significant for income volatility and loan risk. 
Again, our findings hence support the importance of the role played by the second largest 
shareholder in an emerging market (Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Moving to control variables, the political connection variable systematically exhibits a 
significant positive sign highlighting the positive impact of such connections on risk. 
Regarding the other control variables, no conclusive results can be drawn for Listed and Size 
but capitalization is positively associated with income volatility (SDROA) and loan risk 
(NPL) indicating that better capitalized banks take more risk. Consistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Berger et al., 2010; DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006), 
diversification is positively associated with default risk, income volatility, and loan risk. 
Foreign banks do not systematically exhibit different risk profiles with our various indicators 
and a higher market concentration (HHI) significantly increases risk as shown by the 
negative signs for ADZP, ADZP1, and ADZP2 and positive signs for SDROA, SDROE, and 
NPL. Lastly, the coefficient of the deposit insurance variable (Covdep), negative for ADZP, 
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ADZP1, and ADZP2, and positive for SDROA, SDROE, and NPL, indicates that the 
presence of such a scheme encourages banks to take more risk.  
  
5.3.  The impact of family directors 
As discussed above, more than half of East Asian firms are controlled by families and 
Claessens et al. (2000) find that the separation of management from ownership control is rare 
and that two firms out of three have family-related directors. Previous studies also highlight 
that the involvement of family members has a significant impact on the firm's policy and 
performance (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2009; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Pérez-González, 2006; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Anderson et al. (2012) argue 
that family directors, a proxy for active family control, can more readily align the firm’s 
interests with those of the family, suggesting that their impact is potentially magnified.  
The appointment of outside-family directors (professional directors) will lead to the 
misalignment of their interests. Nevertheless, some suggest that a family tends to appoint its 
members on the board although they are less efficient or less capable than professional 
managers available on the market (Morck et al., 2005; Pérez-González, 2006). The family 
director potentially feels less accountable than outside directors because the family is mostly 
biased to its member, suggesting that tenure, talent and other top management criteria are no 
longer necessary. Bertrand et al. (2008) find that greater involvement by family members is 
associated with lower performance due to the dilution of ownership and control across 
equally powerful descendants. Hence, to investigate the governance effect of such an 
involvement we introduce a dummy variable, Family director, which takes the value of 1 if 
the family has its member(s) sitting on the board. This allows us to examine to what extent 
the presence of such directors has an influence on performance. 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ] 
 
Table 5 reports our results with the family director dummy as the variable of interest. The 
presence of family members on the board is related to lower performance, including risk-
adjusted returns (adjROA & adjROE), supporting Villalonga and Amit (2006). Anderson et 
al. (2003) interpret this result as the effect of obtaining directorship position through family 
ties rather than job qualification. Family’s active involvement through its family director 
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induces the bank to take higher default risk, income volatility, and loan risk (see Panel B). 
These results support the argument that families can easily extract benefits and expropriate 
other minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Again, as argued above, the adverse effect of family director’s appointment could be 
mitigated by the presence of an institutional investor with substantial stakes in the bank. 
Table 6 reports that the coexistence of family directors and an institutional investor holding 
at least 10% of the bank's shares, captured by the dummy variable Family director_with_inst,  
is beneficial for the bank as shown by its positive impact on performance. Furthermore, the 
presence of an institutional investor is associated with lower default risk, income volatility, 
and loan risk. Such findings are in line with Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) who argue 
that outside monitoring of family director-led banks is beneficial to limit discretionary 
actions and excessive risk taking.  
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ] 
 
5.4. Other specification and robustness check 
In the previous section we have used Fam_direct to examine the impact of direct 
ownership on performance and risk. To check the robustness of our results, we here consider 
indirect control (Fam_indirect) that equals one if the family owns the bank through ultimate 
shareholding (pyramidal structure) with a minimum of 10% control along the ownership 
chain. We find similar results which are reported in Table 6. Indirect control through 
pyramids is associated with better performance and lower risk. 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ] 
 
Second, we further examine whether our results still hold when we impose a threshold of 
25% which is used by the Indonesian regulatory authorities to define the controlling owners. 
We find similar results with regard to the effect of family ownership on performance and 
risk7. Because of data limitation on multiple shareholders (i.e., family ownership combined 
with another institutional investor at the 25% threshold), our sample size does not allow 
estimating accurate results for the presence institutional investors in family banks.  
                                                          
7
 For brevity, we do not report all the figures. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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We also run regressions by excluding Foreign which is presumably strongly and 
negatively correlated with Family. Indeed, family banks are less likely to open their doors to 
foreigners. Our results are unaltered.  Also, larger banks have more opportunities to diversify 
their activities and there is hence possible collinearity between size and diversification. We 
therefore exclude Diversification from our models. Again, our main results remain 
unchanged.  
6. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the effect of family control on bank performance and risk. We 
consider the case of Indonesia where almost half of the banks are owned by families. Such 
families often own the bank directly and usually appoint their members on the board. But 
they sometimes also control the bank through affiliated firms. In all cases, our results 
highlight that family ownership significantly affects bank performance and risk.  
Specifically, our findings show that, under its various forms (direct ownership, pure 
family ownership, family directors), family ownership negatively affects performance. 
Furthermore, when a family is the single controlling owner or appoints its directors on the 
board, we find that its impact is persistently negative. In contrast, the presence of an 
institutional investor as the second largest owner in a family bank is related to better 
performance. Our results also show that family ownership, under its various forms, is 
associated with higher risk taking and default risk. But again, we find the opposite result 
when institutional investors are strongly present as second largest owners. Our findings are 
generally robust to alternative model specifications and sets of control variables.    
Our results have important policy implications for emerging markets and Indonesia more 
specifically. The existing regulations on corporate governance that, for instance, only require 
banks to declare familial relationships (i.e., between a director and other directors, 
commissioner, and controlling shareholders), and to have a familial-independent president 
director, cannot prevent banks from taking higher risk and performing more poorly. The 
controlling family can assign its members as the family directors (as long as he/she is not the 
president director), to exert a more active involvement in the bank, and possibly to emphasize 
the family’s interests. Inadequate regulations can easily entice the family bank to focus on 
business succession for the next generation although doing so means taking less-profitable 
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and suboptimal investments. The presence of multiple shareholders (i.e., family combined 
with institutional ownership) is a possible solution to effectively improve bank performance 
and reduce risk taking. 
.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of family bank performance and risk 
Panel A. Descriptive for family and non family banks
ROA ROE adjROA adjROE ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL Asset Diver Capital Foreign PolCon d_group
Non-family banks
Mean 3.263 22.628 5.311 5.405 34.713 6.517 27.182 1.426 11.255 5.530 18500 19.896 11.502 0.3471 0.6570 0.1240
SD 1.988 14.446 4.941 6.975 103.505 6.554 80.861 2.852 17.521 7.689 44000 15.924 7.548 0.4765 0.4752 0.3299
Min -6.940 -27.890 -1.798 -1.314 0.536 0.124 0.140 0.012 0.059 0.000 89.8 1.010 0.260 0 0 0
Median 3.245 21.360 3.907 3.085 22.133 4.744 17.038 0.797 6.080 3.265 4128.715 13.746 9.663 0 1 0
Max 10.410 69.930 27.608 58.962 1848.302 56.024 1449.642 49.195 154.676 47.390 338000 65.250 52.942 1 1 1
N 482 475 473 470 361 351 355 480 471 480 484 481 470 484 484 484
Pure family banks
Mean 1.695 11.050 4.115 3.811 47.016 5.131 42.436 1.415 9.764 3.523 5587 8.870 14.987 0 0.497 0.844
SD 2.696 11.394 5.207 5.489 71.549 5.672 68.679 2.061 19.137 3.822 26200 5.693 10.056 0 0.501 0.363
Min -10.660 -36.020 -1.836 -1.622 0.070 0.008 0.665 0.031 0.079 0.000 11.76 0.336 3.141 0 0 0
Median 1.570 9.840 2.691 2.434 26.647 3.069 22.339 0.685 4.273 2.455 454.291 7.544 11.779 0 0 1
Max 15.210 56.380 31.283 51.845 641.869 32.143 625.939 17.121 191.933 23.170 245000 32.095 50.145 0 1 1
N 308 299 300 299 227 207 227 308 307 304 308 302 300 308 308 308
Family & institutional banks
Mean 2.484 15.210 5.241 4.193 40.321 5.299 35.173 0.920 7.469 5.285 13300 19.870 17.107 0.167 0.396 0.938
SD 2.544 15.443 4.861 4.635 38.076 5.061 33.844 0.813 8.595 4.508 16300 11.421 10.498 0.377 0.494 0.245
Min -7.430 -19.450 -0.838 -1.015 2.853 0.316 3.612 0.050 0.145 0.430 218.15 3.133 6.722 0 0 0
Median 2.220 13.325 3.635 2.781 26.526 3.547 23.204 0.557 4.027 3.630 4519.093 17.960 14.649 0 0 1
Max 8.510 64.510 25.400 22.172 189.492 26.400 163.092 3.657 40.236 21.970 62800 41.958 51.069 1 1 1
N 48 48 46 46 40 39 40 47 47 48 48 45 47 48 48 48
All family banks
Mean 1.801 11.626 4.265 3.862 46.013 5.158 41.348 1.350 9.459 3.763551 6626 10.297 15.274 0.022 0.483 0.857
SD 2.686 12.095 5.170 5.379 67.585 5.570 64.670 1.949 18.102 3.96236 25300 7.647 10.127 0.148 0.500 0.351
Min -10.660 -36.020 -1.836 -1.622 0.070 0.008 0.665 0.031 0.079 0 11.76 0.336 3.141 0 0 0
Median 1.630 10.420 2.763 2.513 26.647 3.173 22.382 0.644 4.226 2.56 558.8 7.805 12.148 0 0 1
Max 15.210 64.510 31.283 51.845 641.869 32.143 625.939 17.121 191.933 23.17 245000 41.958 51.069 1 1 1
N 356 347 346 345 267 246 267 355 354 352 356 347 347 356 356 356
Total
Mean 2.642 17.983 4.869 4.752 39.517 5.957 33.263 1.394 10.484 4.782392 13500 15.873 13.104 0.210 0.583 0.435
SD 2.419 14.550 5.062 6.391 90.112 6.199 74.618 2.507 17.784 6.439887 37600 13.932 8.928 0.407 0.493 0.496
Min -10.660 -36.020 -1.836 -1.622 0.070 0.008 0.140 0.012 0.059 0 11.76 0.336 0.260 0 0 0
Median 2.455 15.670 3.405 2.788 23.161 4.054 18.293 0.764 5.130 2.9 1997.6 10.755 10.383 0 1 0
Max 15.210 69.930 31.283 58.962 1848.302 56.024 1449.642 49.195 191.933 47.39 338000 65.250 52.942 1 1 1
N 838 822 819 815 628 597 622 835 825 832 840 828 817 840 840 840
Panel B. t-test of difference in means
Bank groups compared
Non-family banks vs Pure 
family bank 9.3844*** 11.7463*** 3.2110*** 3.3449*** -1.5702* 2.5343*** -2.3509*** 0.0578 1.1182 4.2298*** 4.6519*** 11.5750*** -5.4772*** 12.7802*** 4.5308*** -28.7848***
Non-family banks vs family 
with institutional own 
banks
2.5180*** 3.3688*** 0.092 1.1527 -0.3398 1.1236 -0.6184 1.2109 1.4629* 0.2162 0.8139 0.011 -4.6632*** 2.5449*** 3.6192*** -16.6320***
F mily with institutional 
own banks vs Pure family 
bank
1.8995** 2.2242** 1.3768* 0.4476 -0.5769 0.1726 -0.6542 -1.6262* -0.8091 2.8933*** 1.9744** 10.2718*** 1.3356* 7.8265*** -1.3009* 0.8065
Non-family banks vs all 
family bank 9.0438*** 11.0673*** 3.2591*** 3.2159*** -1.5708* 2.3812*** -2.3324** -0.1905 0.8955 4.3247*** 4.6724*** 11.8468*** -4.6504*** 12.3251*** 3.9032*** -23.4086*** Table 
1 reports statistics descriptive of the variables namely returns on assets (ROA), returns on equity (ROE), risk-adjusted ROA, risk-adjusted ROE as measures of performances. ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, standard deviation of ROA (SDROA), standard 
deviation of ROE (SDROE), and NPL are measures of risks. Total assets is in billions rupiah (Asset), bank’s income diversification index (Diver), and equity to total assets ratio (Capital) is in %. Foreign, PolCon, and d_group is the dummy that take 
value one if the bank is owned by foreign shareholders, politically connected, and a business group’s member, respectively. T-test is for the null:”the mean values of the variables are not different for the compared group banks”. Superscripts ***, **, 
and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. See Appendix A for the details. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix  
ROA ROE adjROA adjROE ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL Family Fam_direct Fam_only Family_with_inst PolCon Listed Size Diver Capital HHI Foreign d_group
ROA 1
ROE 0.6447* 1
adjROA 0.3082* 0.2918* 1
adjROE 0.2354* 0.2303* 0.4537* 1
ADZP 0.0422 -0.0612 0.6272* 0.3018* 1
ADZP1 0.2521* 0.2993* 0.7879* 0.4094* 0.7246* 1
ADZP2 -0.0186 -0.1395* 0.5479* 0.2556* 0.9612* 0.6082* 1
SDROA -0.0516 -0.0116 -0.3210* -0.2122* -0.6755* -0.6207* -0.5844* 1
SDROE -0.1697* 0.0509 -0.2706* -0.2815* -0.5488* -0.4240* -0.5076* 0.4928* 1
NPL -0.0610* -0.1608* -0.2167* -0.1675* -0.2064* -0.2228* -0.1733* 0.2363* 0.2626* 1
Family -0.2974* -0.3729* -0.1021* -0.1193* 0.1187* -0.1685* 0.1872* -0.0151 -0.05 -0.1356* 1
Fam_direct -0.2684* -0.3150* -0.1922* -0.1765* -0.0747* -0.2921* -0.0166 0.0455 0.0503 -0.0543 0.5852* 1
Fam_only -0.3043* -0.3629* -0.1133* -0.1121* 0.0946* -0.1644* 0.1601* 0.0066 -0.0312 -0.1484* 0.8872* 0.6411* 1
Family_with_inst -0.0012 -0.0411 0.0179 -0.0214 0.0544 -0.0191 0.0636 -0.0462 -0.0417 0.0193 0.2870* -0.0852* -0.1873* 1
PolCon 0.0362 0.3508* 0.1488* 0.1801* 0.0399 0.1765* 0.0109 -0.0623* 0.0117 -0.1685* -0.1743* -0.1421* -0.1336* -0.0936* 1
Listed -0.1997* -0.0535 -0.0201 -0.0046 -0.0112 -0.0559 0.0081 -0.0187 -0.0467 0.0719* 0.0874* -0.0432 0.0545 0.0728* 0.1814* 1
Size 0.1318* 0.3181* 0.1629* 0.1254* 0.0091 0.2294* -0.0693* -0.1119* -0.0487 0.055 -0.4631* -0.4818* -0.5316* 0.1177* 0.1991* 0.4179* 1
Diver 0.1415* 0.0129 -0.1091* -0.1240* -0.2493* -0.0912* -0.2729* 0.0703* 0.1243* 0.3192* -0.3314* -0.2813* -0.3772* 0.0789* -0.3278* 0.0175 0.3827* 1
Capital 0.2760* -0.2382* -0.008 -0.0217 0.1827* -0.0760* 0.2414* 0.0652* -0.1391* 0.0408 0.2076* 0.1304* 0.1591* 0.1113* -0.3189* -0.2075* -0.3965* -0.0278 1
HHI -0.0043 0.1457* -0.1778* -0.1683* -0.1637* -0.1050* -0.1539* 0.2830* 0.3236* 0.2177* -0.0032 0.0099 0.0303 -0.0697* -0.0219 -0.0854* -0.1982* -0.0049 -0.0968* 1
Foreign 0.2146* -0.0719* -0.0989* -0.0746* -0.1402* -0.0653 -0.1659* 0.0608* 0.0684* 0.3087* -0.3942* -0.2584* -0.3917* -0.0259 -0.4608* -0.2263* 0.1764* 0.7159* 0.1270* 0 1
d_group -0.2536* -0.3302* -0.0847* -0.0924* 0.1133* -0.1270* 0.1698* -0.0564 -0.1011* -0.1011* 0.7305* 0.3628* 0.6288* 0.2498* -0.1311* 0.3254* -0.2073* -0.2761* 0.1300* -0.0178 -0.4041* 1
Covdep -0.0068 -0.0132 -0.0236 -0.0298 -0.0750* -0.0614 -0.0741* -0.0236 -0.0226 -0.0681* 0.0089 0.0192 0.0272 -0.0376 0.0049 0.0076 0.0112 -0.0354 -0.0381 -0.1973* 0 0.0016
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among the family dummy variables -family (Family), direct control by family (FamDirect), pure family without any other large shareholders (Fam_only), and family with an institutional investor 
(Family_with_inst), performances -return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), risk-adjusted ROA, risk-adjusted ROE-  and risks -standard deviation of ROA (SDROA), standard deviation of ROE (SDROE), ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, 
SDROE, NPL. The rest variables are political connection dummy (PolCon), listed dummy (1= publicly listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign owned, zero otherwise), logarithm of total assets (Size), equity to total assets ratio 
(Capital), bank’s income diversification index (Diversification), banking concentration index (HHI), a business group’s member dummy and coverage of deposit insurance (Covdep). Superscripts * represents the significance at the 10% level or 
smaller. See Appendix A for the details. 
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Table 3. The effect of family ownership on bank performance 
ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Family -0.0882*** -0.630*** -14.52*** -10.95** 
(-3.33) (-3.40) (-2.64) (-2.53)   
Fam_direct -0.0671*** -0.456*** -9.805*** -8.461***
(-3.77) (-3.94) (-3.54) (-2.96)   
Family_only -0.0665*** -0.466*** -10.20*** -8.122***
(-4.08) (-4.39) (-3.14) (-2.85)   
0.266** 1.780** 32.46** 32.88** 
(2.37) (2.45) (2.44) (2.15)   
PolCon -0.0174** -0.120** -4.165** -2.090   -0.000135 0.00861 -1.198* 0.141   -0.00538 -0.0316 -2.106** -0.600   0.0313*** 0.222*** 2.752** 3.893** 
(-2.03) (-1.99) (-2.30) (-1.42)   (-0.04) (0.34) (-1.90) (0.21)   (-1.21) (-1.09) (-2.35) (-0.70)   (2.81) (3.05) (2.05) (2.47)   
Listed 0.0109 0.0816 2.456 1.959   -0.00670* -0.0504* -0.710 -0.348   0.00448 0.0348 1.133 1.003   -0.0145* -0.0952 -1.888* -1.587   
(1.19) (1.30) (1.23) (1.20)   (-1.65) (-1.86) (-0.92) (-0.43)   (0.74) (0.87) (0.81) (0.82)   (-1.65) (-1.55) (-1.67) (-1.22)   
Size -0.00587* -0.0389* -0.979 -0.640   -0.00318 -0.0139 -0.327 -0.290   -0.00493* -0.0307* -0.695 -0.478   -0.00215 -0.00859 -0.0100 -0.0962   
(-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.43) (-1.20)   (-1.44) (-1.04) (-1.00) (-0.88)   (-1.96) (-1.94) (-1.38) (-1.12)   (-0.65) (-0.40) (-0.02) (-0.23)   
Capital 0.132*** 0.118 6.804** 4.340   0.0854*** -0.174* -0.578 -0.940   0.106*** -0.0678 2.065 1.241   0.0223 -0.609* -7.936 -8.147   
(6.66) (1.12) (2.02) (1.59)   (4.59) (-1.72) (-0.21) (-0.33)   (6.09) (-0.79) (0.79) (0.48)   (0.46) (-1.95) (-1.37) (-1.25)   
Diver 0.0129 0.0780 -3.621 -9.874*** 0.00124 -0.0328 -5.813*** -11.02*** -0.00425 -0.0524 -6.648*** -11.89*** -0.0568 -0.428* -13.71*** -18.24***
(0.78) (0.69) (-1.37) (-3.14)   (0.11) (-0.44) (-3.09) (-3.83)   (-0.36) (-0.66) (-3.39) (-3.93)   (-1.62) (-1.80) (-3.15) (-3.29)   
Foreign -0.0390*** -0.361*** -8.310*** -4.161*  -0.00666 -0.120*** -2.821*** -0.216   -0.0190** -0.213*** -4.771*** -1.720   0.0422** 0.211 3.460 5.657** 
(-2.61) (-3.62) (-2.87) (-1.85)   (-1.25) (-3.95) (-3.30) (-0.18)   (-2.40) (-4.53) (-3.39) (-1.21)   (2.16) (1.63) (1.49) (2.02)   
HHI -0.000679 0.00598 -0.806*** -0.755*** -0.000166 0.0100* -0.668*** -0.708*** -0.0000489 0.0105** -0.678*** -0.675*** 0.00175 0.0214** -0.392** -0.493** 
(-0.62) (0.84) (-3.73) (-4.05)   (-0.20) (1.92) (-4.65) (-4.48)   (-0.06) (2.08) (-4.27) (-4.30)   (1.31) (2.32) (-2.36) (-2.45)   
Constant 0.154** 1.075** 35.70** 27.94** 0.0798* 0.450* 19.73*** 18.57*** 0.118** 0.792** 27.40*** 22.73*** 0.0105 0.0184 7.706 9.248   
(2.20) (2.26) (2.46) (2.43)   (1.84) (1.70) (3.08) (2.77)   (2.38) (2.55) (2.76) (2.62)   (0.24) (0.06) (1.41) (1.54)   
No. obs 795 781 780 776   795 781 780 776   795 781 780 776   795 781 780 776   
F-stat 9.345*** 14.65*** 5.931*** 6.694   *** 14.39*** 20.85*** 9.849*** 7.916  *** 13.62*** 19.92*** 8.775*** 7.524  *** 3.354*** 5.417*** 5.810*** 4.327 ***
Hansen J-stat 0.137 0.286 2.089 0.454 0.177 0.426 3.952** 0.491 0.445 0.811 4.488** 0.847 0.447 0.607 5.754** 1.069
Endog. test 24.197*** 29.024*** 13.182*** 7.876*** 20.269*** 26.809*** 10.084*** 4.946** 22.256*** 26.509*** 10.856*** 7.439*** 25.502*** 31.096*** 6.839*** 8.081***
Panel D
Family_with
_inst.
Dependent 
var.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Table 3 reports the IV/2SLS estimation with robust adjustment for small samples by Windmeijer (2000). The dependent variables are ROE, adjROA, ROE, and adjROE. adjROA and adjROE. Explanatory variables are the dummies of family 
(Family), direct control by family (Fam_direct), sole control by family (Family_only), control by family and  institution (Family_with_inst), political connection (PolCon), listed dummy (1=listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign 
owned, zero otherwise), natural logarithm of total assets (Size), equity to total assets ratio (Capital), bank’s income diversification (Diver), dummy for foreign bank (Foreign) and banking concentration index (HHI). We also include dummy for the 
2008 crisis period. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4. The effect of family ownership on bank risk 
ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Family -0.939*** -2.296** -0.807** 0.773** 1.002*** 0.452   
(-2.63) (-2.03) (-2.25) (2.55) (3.29) (1.61)   
Fam_direct -1.191*** -1.845*** -1.234*** 1.039*** 1.105*** 0.767***
(-4.19) (-2.59) (-4.59) (4.14) (4.46) (3.16)   
Family only -0.813*** -1.608*** -0.700** 0.694*** 0.882*** 0.407*  
(-2.65) (-4.73) (-2.27) (2.62) (3.27) (1.68)   
0.974** 10.24** 1.287*** -0.836* -7.160** -1.022** 
(2.19) (2.48) (2.76) (-1.96) (-2.14) (-2.16)   
PolCon -0.385** -0.674 -0.367** 0.396*** 0.558*** 0.0158   -0.278*** -0.173 -0.306*** 0.329*** 0.406*** 0.00219   -0.279** -0.288** -0.275** 0.319*** 0.436*** -0.0473   -0.0223 1.084** -0.0103 0.0939 -0.369 -0.224** 
(-2.47) (-1.62) (-2.33) (2.78) (3.82) (0.12)   (-2.75) (-1.10) (-2.92) (3.34) (3.84) (0.02)   (-2.18) (-2.03) (-2.16) (2.70) (3.55) (-0.43)   (-0.20) (2.55) (-0.09) (0.90) (-1.25) (-2.16)   
Listed 0.217 0.273 0.363* -0.262 -0.410** 0.402*** 0.0728 -0.326* 0.270** -0.130 -0.232* 0.428*** 0.165 -0.0230 0.318* -0.208 -0.361** 0.416*** -0.102 -0.790* 0.0666 -0.00165 -0.0979 0.557***
(1.05) (0.58) (1.77) (-1.52) (-2.48) (2.64)   (0.54) (-1.92) (1.97) (-1.02) (-1.90) (3.48)   (0.87) (-0.11) (1.69) (-1.25) (-2.28) (2.84)   (-0.73) (-1.68) (0.45) (-0.01) (-0.35) (4.40)   
Size 0.0122 -0.0747 -0.0132 0.0260 0.0990** 0.0362   -0.0147 0.00705 -0.0606 0.0466 0.0981** 0.0791*  0.00704 -0.0260 -0.0174 0.0271 0.0968* 0.0401   0.104*** -0.0357 0.0567 -0.0496 0.160 0.00152   
(0.19) (-0.49) (-0.20) (0.54) (2.02) (0.73)   (-0.27) (0.08) (-1.18) (1.14) (2.49) (1.88)   (0.11) (-0.41) (-0.26) (0.53) (1.90) (0.79)   (2.68) (-0.26) (1.50) (-1.55) (1.56) (0.05)   
Capital 2.919*** 0.649 3.478*** 2.237*** -1.381** 0.986*  2.190*** -0.264 2.759*** 2.967*** -0.665 1.420*** 2.593*** 0.0161 3.199*** 2.561*** -1.059* 1.124** 2.400*** -3.273 2.891*** 2.723*** 1.428 1.475***
(4.37) (0.84) (4.78) (3.99) (-2.23) (1.86)   (3.25) (-0.38) (3.70) (5.17) (-1.09) (2.61)   (3.91) (0.02) (4.40) (4.67) (-1.75) (2.11)   (3.81) (-1.61) (4.17) (5.03) (0.89) (2.78)   
Diver. -2.777*** -1.479** -3.122*** 1.440*** 2.834*** 1.555*** -2.733*** -1.721*** -3.067*** 1.518*** 3.009*** 1.498*** -2.914*** -1.931*** -3.246*** 1.616*** 3.147*** 1.555*** -3.094*** -3.918** -3.436*** 1.745*** 4.468*** 1.861***
(-4.39) (-2.03) (-4.97) (3.06) (5.13) (3.12)   (-4.37) (-3.05) (-4.81) (3.19) (5.55) (3.06)   (-4.80) (-3.53) (-5.42) (3.44) (5.78) (3.15)   (-5.21) (-2.42) (-5.75) (3.62) (3.95) (3.63)   
Foreign -0.319 -1.072* -0.275 0.598*** 0.119 0.503** -0.114 -0.295 -0.142 0.425*** -0.176 0.449*** -0.157 -0.500** -0.135 0.473** -0.0748 0.429** 0.275 1.542** 0.276 0.0933 -1.394*** 0.132   
(-1.23) (-1.69) (-1.11) (2.71) (0.49) (2.26)   (-0.62) (-1.18) (-0.83) (2.62) (-0.98) (2.58)   (-0.73) (-2.15) (-0.67) (2.53) (-0.36) (2.25)   (1.51) (2.10) (1.57) (0.55) (-2.60) (0.71)   
HHI -0.173*** -0.161** -0.177*** 0.168*** 0.273*** 0.137*** -0.178*** -0.143** -0.187*** 0.172*** 0.285*** 0.141*** -0.164*** -0.128** -0.169*** 0.163*** 0.273*** 0.130*** -0.139*** -0.0340 -0.145*** 0.146*** 0.230*** 0.117***
(-2.98) (-2.13) (-2.92) (4.04) (5.95) (3.43)   (-3.32) (-2.48) (-3.25) (4.44) (6.70) (3.64)   (-2.95) (-2.15) (-2.91) (4.05) (6.14) (3.28)   (-2.68) (-0.25) (-2.61) (3.85) (3.33) (2.98)   
Covdep -0.122** -0.140** -0.138** 0.114** 0.140** 0.0272   -0.118** -0.135** -0.134** 0.114** 0.147*** 0.0259   -0.117** -0.122* -0.133** 0.114** 0.144** 0.0196   -0.113** -0.0609 -0.128** 0.112** 0.118 0.0156   
(-2.27) (-1.98) (-2.50) (2.28) (2.46) (0.54)   (-2.37) (-2.42) (-2.55) (2.44) (2.76) (0.52)   (-2.20) (-1.93) (-2.46) (2.28) (2.53) (0.39)   (-2.18) (-0.42) (-2.35) (2.28) (1.20) (0.30)   
Constant 5.507*** 6.076* 5.637*** -3.871*** -3.735*** -6.109*** 5.776*** 3.893** 6.342*** -4.143*** -3.636*** -6.763*** 5.360*** 4.475*** 5.516*** -3.778*** -3.591*** -6.001*** 3.220*** 2.023 3.740*** -2.064*** -3.153** -5.046***
(3.89) (1.84) (3.91) (-3.52) (-3.41) (-5.58)   (5.32) (2.22) (5.90) (-4.86) (-4.30) (-7.60)   (4.00) (3.38) (4.01) (-3.52) (-3.35) (-5.57)   (3.93) (0.90) (4.44) (-3.05) (-2.01) (-7.11)   
No. obs. 599 575 597 699 698 677   599 575 597 699 698 677   599 575 597 699 698 677   599 575 597 699 698 677   
F-stat 7.344*** 6.364*** 7.323*** 12.03*** 11.75*** 12.68   *** 9.561*** 7.957*** 9.682*** 14.23*** 14.72*** 13.33  *** 7.655*** 8.914*** 7.776*** 13.15*** 12.48*** 11.98 *** 7.490*** 2.854*** 7.701*** 13.73*** 4.064*** 12.29  ***
Hansen J-stat. 0.082 0.182 0.000 1.388 3.440 4.408 0.183 0.262 0.075 1.438 0.142 3.372 0.035 0.510 0.001 0.353 0.010 2.886 0.351 0.626 0.115 0.597 0.432 1.707
Endog. test 13.206*** 6.650*** 11.988*** 12.781*** 17.319*** 5.622** 13.455*** 3.740* 17.574*** 11.684*** 10.742*** 8.536*** 13.596*** 29.005*** 12.483*** 14.160*** 17.570*** 9.995*** 4.127** 24.077*** 6.885*** 3.228* 10.174*** 9.572***
Family_with_
inst
Dependent 
var.
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Table 4 reports the IV/2SLS estimation with robust adjustment for small samples by Windmeijer (2000).  The dependent variables are ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, SDROE, NPL and in natural logarithm. Explanatory variables are family (Family), direct 
control by family (Fam_direct), sole control by family (Family_only), control by family and  institution (Family_with_inst), political connection (PolCon), listed dummy (1=listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign owned, zero otherwise), 
logarithm of total assets (Size), equity to total assets ratio (Capital), bank’s income diversification (Diver), banking concentration index (HHI) and coverage of deposit insurance (Covdep). We also include dummy for the 2008 crisis period. Superscripts ***, **, 
and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5. Family directors and bank performance and risk 
ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Family director -0.0633*** -0.498*** -10.36*** -7.885** -1.471** -2.799*** -1.268* 1.157** 1.532*** 0.686*  
(-4.07) (-3.84) (-2.78) (-2.57)   (-2.21) (-3.32) (-1.94) (2.17) (2.66) (1.75)   
PolCon -0.0108** -0.0734* -2.757** -0.947   -0.520** -0.848** -0.484** 0.493** 0.683*** 0.0683   
(-2.01) (-1.69) (-2.21) (-0.89)   (-2.23) (-2.55) (-2.11) (2.51) (3.18) (0.45)   
Listed -0.0000678 0.00319 0.345 0.320   0.266 0.206 0.406 -0.258 -0.440** 0.384** 
(-0.01) (0.08) (0.26) (0.29)   (1.04) (0.63) (1.64) (-1.26) (-2.12) (2.40)   
Size -0.00223 -0.0108 -0.177 -0.0334   -0.00662 -0.0747 -0.0293 0.0291 0.103 0.0414   
(-1.41) (-0.82) (-0.45) (-0.11)   (-0.08) (-0.78) (-0.37) (0.50) (1.63) (0.80)   
Capital 0.104*** 0.0959 7.088** 4.647*  3.030*** 0.607 3.572*** 2.159*** -1.552** 0.949*  
(6.71) (0.96) (2.30) (1.77)   (4.05) (0.66) (4.60) (3.47) (-2.18) (1.68)   
Diver. -0.00366 -0.0932 -7.672*** -12.51*** -3.253*** -2.113*** -3.545*** 1.838*** 3.457*** 1.803***
(-0.28) (-0.97) (-3.27) (-3.87)   (-4.65) (-2.79) (-5.29) (3.42) (5.15) (3.55)   
Foreign 0.000565 -0.227*** -4.842*** -1.674   -0.359 -1.009** -0.307 0.633** 0.146 0.520** 
(0.83) (-3.94) (-2.95) (-1.09)   (-1.18) (-2.42) (-1.06) (2.49) (0.50) (2.33)   
HHI -0.0190** 0.0151*** -0.586*** -0.577*** -0.175*** -0.146* -0.179*** 0.165*** 0.279*** 0.136***
(-2.53) (2.86) (-3.78) (-3.81)   (-2.65) (-1.84) (-2.68) (3.61) (5.35) (3.29)   
Covdep -0.130** -0.153* -0.146** 0.121** 0.156** 0.0293   
(-2.10) (-1.81) (-2.38) (2.16) (2.39) (0.56)   
Constant 0.0744** 0.479* 18.93** 15.05** 6.078*** 6.225*** 6.146*** -4.104*** -4.148*** -6.293***
(2.23) (1.74) (2.28) (2.22)   (3.43) (2.86) (3.46) (-3.05) (-2.92) (-5.33)   
No. obs. 781 781 780 776   599 575 597 699 698 677   
F-stat. 11.11*** 15.05*** 7.806*** 7.366 *** 6.150*** 5.006*** 6.788*** 11.26*** 10.06*** 12.24***  
Hansen J-stat 1.909 0.515 3.227* 0.642 0.027 0.270 0.001 0.017 0.016 0.991
Endog. test 26.548*** 28.413*** 12.020*** 8.115*** 12.359*** 25.442*** 10.343*** 13.413*** 19.929*** 5.321**
Dependent var. Panel A. Performance Panel B. Risk
Table 5 reports the IV/2SLS estimation with robust adjustment for small samples by Windmeijer (2000). The dependent variables are performance (ROA, ROE, adj 
ROA, adj ROE) and risk (ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, SDROE, NPL). Explanatory variables are family director, political connection (PolCon), listed dummy 
(1=listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign owned, zero otherwise), logarithm of total assets (Size), equity to total assets ratio (Capital), bank’s income 
diversification (Diver), banking concentration index (HHI) and coverage of deposit insurance (Covdep). We also include dummy for the 2008 crisis period.  Superscripts ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity 
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Table 6. Bank with family director(s) and institutional ownership, performance and risk 
ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
0.174*** 1.146*** 61.42** 69.15** 3.535*** 3.019*** 4.128*** -3.287*** -3.524*** -2.214** 
(2.64) (2.61) (2.57) (2.48)   (2.93) (2.77) (3.25) (-3.13) (-3.19) (-2.45)   
PolCon 0.0248*** 0.178*** 5.959*** 7.549*** 0.174 0.404*** 0.223 -0.111 -0.0628 -0.328***
(3.95) (4.45) (2.84) (3.34)   (1.11) (2.89) (1.43) (-0.83) (-0.45) (-2.73)   
Listed -0.0148***-0.0984*** -1.897 -1.533   -0.122 -0.621*** 0.0793 -0.00327 -0.0844 0.525***
(-3.41) (-3.37) (-1.07) (-0.81)   (-0.64) (-2.93) (0.39) (-0.02) (-0.49) (3.75)   
Size -0.000508 0.00552 -0.673 -0.982   0.0457 0.140*** -0.0112 0.00688 0.0585 0.0414   
(-0.27) (0.44) (-0.96) (-1.29)   (0.87) (3.48) (-0.21) (0.17) (1.40) (1.10)   
Capital 0.0542** -0.221 -9.317 -11.87   1.809** -0.135 2.185*** 3.214*** -0.405 1.677***
(2.22) (-1.54) (-1.13) (-1.25)   (2.39) (-0.19) (2.60) (5.22) (-0.59) (2.88)   
Diver -0.00807 -0.105 -12.16** -18.37*** -3.189*** -2.215*** -3.478*** 1.893*** 3.401*** 1.846***
(-0.53) (-1.02) (-2.24) (-2.96)   (-4.75) (-3.68) (-4.99) (3.42) (5.50) (3.51)   
Foreign 0.0305*** 0.125* 7.859** 11.18*** 0.600** 0.502** 0.649*** -0.239 -0.889*** -0.0515   
(2.84) (1.81) (2.04) (2.67)   (2.52) (2.19) (2.69) (-1.08) (-3.65) (-0.25)   
HHI 0.00133 0.0192*** -0.193 -0.602** -0.122** -0.0834 -0.127** 0.138*** 0.248*** 0.131***
(1.62) (3.50) (-0.76) (-2.00)   (-2.07) (-1.38) (-2.01) (3.32) (5.33) (3.15)   
Covdep -0.0925 -0.101 -0.101 0.0992* 0.128** 0.0222   
(-1.53) (-1.56) (-1.58) (1.77) (2.01) (0.42)   
Constant -0.00552 -0.158 13.14 20.10*  3.703*** 0.435 4.297*** -2.621*** -2.022** -1.087   
(-0.21) (-0.89) (1.31) (1.77)   (3.63) (0.46) (4.04) (-3.23) (-2.34) (-1.40)   
No. obs. 687 689 687 684   598 573 592 699 698 681   
F-stat. 13.33*** 20.36*** 4.011*** 4.092*** 5.978*** 6.329*** 5.405*** 10.72*** 9.177*** 12.23 ***
Hansen J-stat 8.700* 9.845* 6.381 6.062 0.717 1.232 0.329 0.739 0.347 2.057
Endog. test 9.334*** 7.255*** 16.820*** 12.185*** 17.588*** 20.276*** 23.152*** 16.076*** 19.334*** 8.753***
Dependent var. Panel A. Performance Panel B. Risk
Family 
director_with_inst
Table 6 reports the IV/2SLS estimation with robust adjustment for small samples by Windmeijer (2000). The dependent variables are performance (ROA, ROE, adj 
ROA, adj ROE) and risk (ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, SDROE, NPL). Explanatory variables are family director when an institutional investor exists, political 
connection (PolCon), listed dummy (1=listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign owned, zero otherwise), logarithm of total assets (Size), equity to total 
assets ratio (Capital), bank’s income diversification (Diver), banking concentration index (HHI) and coverage of deposit insurance (Covdep). We also include dummy for 
the 2008 crisis period.  Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected 
for White heteroskedasticity 
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Table 7. Family indirect control and bank performance and risk 
ROA ROE adj ROA adj ROE ADZP ADZP1 ADZP2 SDROA SDROE NPL   
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Fam_indirect 0.0494*** 0.232** 23.72*** 36.05*** 7.448*** 3.508*** 2.458*** -2.598*** -3.001*** -8.183***
(2.69) (2.39) (3.35) (3.47)   (3.23) (3.27) (3.13) (-3.62) (-3.56) (-4.64)   
PolCon 0.0181*** 0.115*** 4.452*** 7.318*** 1.075** 0.750*** 0.265 -0.242 -0.238 -1.381***
(4.64) (5.64) (3.27) (3.39)   (2.33) (2.64) (1.46) (-1.41) (-1.17) (-3.12)   
Listed -0.0255*** -0.153*** -6.811*** -8.537*** -1.579** -1.398*** -0.368* 0.465** 0.452** 1.976***
(-5.87) (-6.14) (-3.58) (-2.98)   (-2.53) (-4.17) (-1.80) (2.45) (1.97) (3.85)   
Size 0.00493*** 0.0366*** 1.017*** 0.931** 0.163* 0.253*** 0.0664* -0.0651* -0.0287 -0.0433   
(5.80) (8.38) (3.56) (2.04)   (1.71) (4.63) (1.70) (-1.75) (-0.70) (-0.43)   
Capital 0.102*** -0.100 -11.92 -21.09** -1.939 -0.880 2.072** 3.869*** 0.132 5.845***
(5.21) (-1.02) (-1.60) (-2.03)   (-0.83) (-0.72) (2.19) (4.24) (0.13) (2.72)   
Diver -0.00299 -0.0179 -8.740** -14.72** -2.898** -2.168*** -2.651*** 1.449** 3.094*** 1.541   
(-0.24) (-0.26) (-2.21) (-2.42)   (-2.08) (-2.73) (-3.86) (2.28) (4.38) (1.20)   
Foreign 0.0211*** 0.0373 6.571*** 12.56*** 2.197*** 1.104** 0.696** -0.499* -1.239*** -1.969***
(3.21) (1.07) (2.63) (3.31)   (2.87) (2.48) (2.32) (-1.68) (-3.77) (-2.86)   
HHI 0.00205** 0.0234*** -0.157 -0.620   -0.141 -0.0670 -0.153** 0.142*** 0.252*** 0.0483   
(2.40) (4.95) (-0.53) (-1.32)   (-0.89) (-0.78) (-2.25) (2.79) (4.24) (0.37)   
Covdep -0.0870 -0.116 -0.109* 0.101 0.137* -0.0473   
(-0.55) (-1.31) (-1.66) (1.54) (1.80) (-0.28)   
Constant -0.0964*** -0.636*** -13.75** -12.22   0.370 -2.086 2.925*** -1.088 -0.194 -1.391   
(-5.90) (-7.53) (-2.51) (-1.37)   (0.15) (-1.44) (2.91) (-1.25) (-0.19) (-0.58)   
No. obs. 682 671 682 681   596 563 583 681 680 670   
F-stat. 15.83 23.61 4.403 2.936 2.937 4.096 6.703 7.470 7.548 3.334 
Hansen J-stat 3.703 5.702 2.673 0.070 0.093 0.277 0.217 1.158 0.055 0.462
Endogoneity test 11.659*** 11.134*** 34.720*** 62.376*** 51.89*** 14.533*** 7.630*** 13.714*** 17.577*** 102.315***
Dependent var. Panel B. RiskPanel A. Performance
Table 7 the IV/2SLS estimation with robust adjustment for small samples by Windmeijer (2000).  The dependent variables are performance (ROA, 
ROE, adj ROA, adj ROE) and risk (ADZP, ADZP1, ADZP2, SDROA, SDROE, NPL). Explanatory variables are family indirect control, political 
connection (PolCon), listed dummy (1=listed, zero otherwise), foreign bank dummy (1=foreign owned, zero otherwise), logarithm of total assets 
(Size), equity to total assets ratio (Capital), bank’s income diversification (Diver), banking concentration index (HHI) and coverage of deposit 
insurance (Covdep). We also include dummy for the 2008 crisis period. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and 
.10 levels respectively. t-statistics shown in parentheses are corrected for White heteroskedasticity. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Description Source 
Panel A: Dependent  variables 
ROA Return on total assets is net income divided by total assets Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
ROE Return on total equity is net income divided by total equity Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
adjROA Return on assets divided by standard deviation of the last three 
year for each respective year 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
adjROE Return on equity divided by standard deviation of the last three 
year for each respective year 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
Z-score (ADZP) Return on assets (ROA) plus equity to total assets ratio, divided by 
the standard deviation of last three-year ROA 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
ADZP1 Average return on assets (ROA) divided by the standard deviation 
of last three-year ROA 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
ADZP2 Average equity to total assets ratio, divided by the standard 
deviation of last three-year ROA 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
NPL Bank non performing loan is total non-performing loans divided 
by total gross loans 
Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
Std. Dev of ROA Standard deviation of last three-year return on assets Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
Std. Dev of ROE Standard deviation of last three-year return on equity Annual Reports, 
Bankscope 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Family Dummy variable that take 1 (one) if at least 10% of the bank 
ownership in any forms is controlled/owned by a family and zero 
otherwise.  
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Fam_direct Dummy variable that take 1 (one) if the family including its 
individual members has total direct ownership at least 10%, zero 
otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Family_only Dummy variable equal to 1 (one) if the family owns at least 10% 
of the bank without any other institutional shareholder holding at 
least 10% of the shares, zero otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Family_with_inst Dummy variable equal to 1 (one) if the family owns at least 10% 
of the bank and there is an institutional shareholder holding at least 
10% of the shares, zero otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Fam director Dummy variable equal to 1 (one) if the owning family appoints 
one of its members as the directors(s), zero otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Fam 
director_with_inst 
Dummy variable equal to 1 (one) if the owning family appoints 
one of its members as the directors(s) and there is an institutional 
shareholder holding at least 10% of the shares, zero otherwise, 
zero otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
Fam_Indirect Dummy variable that take 1 (one) when the family hold 
ownerships at least 10% of the shares through its affiliated firms, 
zero otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, News 
releases 
PolCon Dummy variable equals one (1) if the bank is a state-owned banks 
or private banks that at least one of their owners, directors, or 
commissioners (supervisory body) is a political party member, a 
parliament member, a government official, a former of parliament 
member and/ or a former of government official, and zero 
otherwise 
Annual Reports, 
Indonesian Banks 
Association, other 
sources, News releases 
Size 
Income 
Diversification 
(Diver) 
 
Logarithm of total assets 
 
Annual Reports 
Annual Reports  
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Capital Total equity divided by total assets Annual Reports 
Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index 
(HHI) 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index of banking concentration, as follows: 
, where si is the percentage of bank-i assets in the 
banking sector 
Annual Reports, Bank 
Indonesa 
Foreign  Dummy that takes 1 (one) if there is foreign ownerships (Foreign) 
of 50% or more and zero otherwise 
Annual Reports 
Listed Dummy that equals 1 (one) if the bank is publicly listed and zero 
otherwise 
Annual Reports 
Covdep The natural log value of (1+coverage deposits), where coverage 
deposits is the ratio of the maximum deposit insurance coverage 
limit per deposit per capita 
Authors’calculation 
based on the data from 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2005), updated for 
Asia  
 
 
 
 
